Another Bad Contractor with a Security Clearance

This is lengthy because it includes an indictment of Donald J. Sachtleben, another cleared government employee who gives us reason to suspect the security clearance process of the Federal Government is not all its cracked up to be.  I encourage you to read it, if you have any involvement in classified work in the government.

This is the guy I wrote about in my latest book.  He got information about the person who built a bomb delivered to the FBI for analysis.  Several news reports say this bomb was collected by a person, who has since been named, and risked his life getting it out.

Sachtleben was not an FBI employee at the time the crime was committed;  he was a cleared contractor.

The press has loudly claimed that this Justice Department prosecution raised the spectre of a complete loss of protection of sources, yet the only way this person was discovered was his contact with Reporter A in the indictment.  Reporter A's sources' telephone numbers were gathered as a part of that investigation, so we all know who he is now.

Sachtleben would never have been prosecuted had it not been for those phone records, so reporters want to make sure that doesn't happen again.

Read the whole thing carefully and look at the relationship between the reporter, the contractor and the disclosure of classified information.  Then, tell me we need new laws to protect the press.

We need new laws to protect us from people who have set out to use the press as a shield to collect things that will get our sources and methods in the public domain.  Snowden is not the first of his kind, nor likely to be the last.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  No. v. 3 DONALD JOHN SACHTLEBEN,  Defendant.  STATEMENT OF OFFENSE Should this matter proceed to trial, the United States of America would prove the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: A Introduction 1. On or about May 2, 2012, the defendant DONALD JOHN SACHTLEBEN having authorized access to national defense information relating to a disrupted suicide bomb attack on a U.S.--bound airliner by the Yemen-based terrorist organization Al--Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the recovery by the United States of a bomb in connection with that plot in April 2012 (referred to hereinafter as "the bomb"), willfully disclosed such national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it, namely a reporter with a national news organization ("Reporter At the time of his unauthorized disclosure, SACHTLEBEN had reason to believe that his unauthorized disclosure of such national defense information could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. In or about May 2012, SACHTLEBEN also willfully possessed and retained national defense information in his residence in Carmel, Indiana, including an intelligence report classified at the SECRET level that remains so classified to this day.

Defendant's Background  

2. SACHTLEBEN was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation from on or about 1983 through 2008. In the course of his career, SACHTLEBEN was a Special Agent Bomb Technician assigned to many FBI Major Cases involving terrorist attacks, including the Oklahoma City bombing, the first World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber attacks, the United States Embassy bombings in East Africa, the U.S.S. COLE bombing, and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Among other assignments, SACHTLEBEN was assigned to the Explosives Unit at the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia Lab"). SACHTLEBEN held a TOP SECRET security clearance as an FBI employee on account of his official responsibilities at the FBI. As a result, SACHTLEBEN had regular access to classified and national defense information relating to the BI's activities, as well as the 

activities of other members of the United States Intelligence Community.  

3. In or about 2008, SACHTLEBEN retired from the FBI and was rehired as a contractor. SACHTLEBEN 

maintained his TOP SECRET security clearance as an FBI contractor on account of his official 

responsibilities at the FBI. As a result, SACHTLEBEN continued to have regular access to classified and 

national defense information relating to the FBI's activities, as well as the activities of other members of the United States Intelligence Community. As a contractor, SACHTLEBEN routinely visited the FBI Lab. SACHTLEBEN was employed as an FBI contractor until on or about May 11, 2012.  

4. Beginning in or about 1983, in connection with the start of his employment with the FBI, SACHTLEBEN 

entered into various non--disclosure agreements with the United States, obligating him not to disclose 

national defense information to any unauthorized person and advising him that any such unauthorized 

disclosure could constitute a violation of United States criminal laws, including Title 18, United States Code, Section 793. SACHTLEBEN entered into such non-disclosure agreements both as an FBI employee and as an FBI contractor. The scope of these non-disclosure agreements encompasses the national defense 

information referenced in this Statement of Offense. Defendant's Relationship with Reporter A  

5. Beginning in or about the fall of 2009, SACHTLEBEN developed a source-reporter relationship with 

Repoter A. Their source-reporter relationship initially focused on SACHTLEBEN's contract work on the FBI's National Improvised Explosives amiliarization training program. Their source-reporter relationship 

quickly developed into other areas beyond the NIEF program. For example, from in or about January 2010 

through in or about May 2012, in emails, text messages, and conversations, SACHTLEBEN provided Reporter A with information about explosives used in terrorist plots or attacks and the FBI's analysis of such 

explosives. While doing so, SACHTLEBEN repeatedly requested Reporter A to keep his true identity and his relationship with Reporter A protected and confidential. When discussing in an email exchange how to 

refer to SACHTLEBEN as an anonymous source for an article to be published, SACHTLEBEN asked Reporter A 

not refer to him as a contractor because there was a "[p]retty small number of us." (The emails and text messages between SACHTLEBEN and Reporter A referenced in this Statement of Offense were obtained from 

SACHTLEBEN's electronic devices).  Defendant's Unauthorized Disclosure of National Defense Information  

6. On or about April 30, 2012, following the disruption of a suicide bomb attack on a U.S.--bound airline by AQAP and the recovery by the United States of a bomb in connection  with that plot, the bomb arrived at the FBI Lab for forensic analysis. 

7. On or about April 30, 2012, at approximately 6:30 ABC World News Tonight broadcast a news story which stated, in part, that for the past year United States and European officials had warned that AQAP's 

master bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, had been designing surgically implanted body bombs to get past 

airport security, and that there was concern that AQAP may soon try to explode a U.S.-bound aircraft with explosives hidden inside the bodies of terrorists.  

8. On or about April 30, 2012, later that evening, beginning at approximately 7: 14  SACHTLEBEN and 

Reporter A exchanged text messages about al--Asiri and Reporter A's speculation about the FBI's recovery of a surgically implanted body bomb (also known as a "cavity bomb"). (Note: the bomb referenced in 

Paragraph 6 above was not a surgically  implanted body bomb or cavity bomb.) These text messages were as follows:  Date Time Originating Terminating Content of Text Message Cellular Phone Cellular Phone  4/30/2012 7:14 p.m. Reporter A SACHTLEBEN Al-Asiri is up to his old tricks. I wonder if ur boys got a hold of a cavity bomb  4/30/2012 7: l4 p.m. Reporter A SACHTLEBEN   4/30/2012 7:15 p.m. SACHTLEBEN Reporter A Yikes. Remind me to bring sum purell to the lab  4/30/2012 7: 16 p.m. Reporter A SACHTLEBEN Not totally sure though  

9. On or about May 1, 2012, beginning at approximately 9:48 SACHTLEBEN and Reporter A exchanged two more text messages. These text messages were as follows:  Date Time Originating Terminating Content of Text Message Cellular Phone Cellular Phone 5/1/2012 9:48 am. SACHTLEBEN Reporter A Hmm. Methinks the 10am news 

conf may be related 5/1/2012 9:51 a.m. Reporter A SACHTLEBEN Ah!

10. On or about May 1, 2012, at approximately 10:00 the FBI held a news conference concerning the arrest of five men in Cleveland, Ohio, who were charged with plotting a bomb attack on a bridge in Ohio. This FBI news conference had nothing to do with the bomb referenced in Paragraph 6 above. 

11. On or about May 1, 2012, just prior to departing from the Indianapolis airport and upon landing at the Washington-Dulles airport for a previously planned trip to the FBI. Lab the following day May 2, 2012), SACHTLEBEN sent two more text messages to Reporter A.  These texts were as follows:  Date Time Originating Terminating Content of Text Message Cellular Phone Cellular Phone  5/ 1/2012 9:52 a.m. SACHTLEBEN Reporter A Just abt to take off. Will curious to coverage when i land at dulles. Hope that tsa doesnt get out the rubber gloves and ky  5/1/2012 12:49 p.m. SACHTLEBEN Reporter A Got that one wrong. A lil surprised they wrkin 24 hr shifts cuz of those mutts. Still sumthin else brewin. Will find out tomorrow (Emphasis added.) 

12. On or about May 2, 2012, at approximately 8:39 SACHTLEBEN used his FBI- issued badge to enter the FBI Lab. Among other things, SACHTLEBEN logged into the FBI's classified computer system from a computer terminal located within the FBI Lab in an administrative space designated for the Explosives Unit. That administrative space was directly across the hallway from the examination space for the Explosives Unit, where the bomb was then being examined. SACHTLEBEN also used his FBI-issued badge to enter the examination space for the Explosives Unit. SACHTLEBEN did not access any documents on the FBI's classified  computer system about the bomb and did not sign the sign-in sheet for access to a specific room within the examination space for the Explosives Unit designated for the examination of the bomb. 

13. On or about May 2, 2012, at approximately 10:25 SACHTLEBEN called Reporter A and spoke with him for a little over two minutes. In that call, SACHTLEBEN disclosed to Reporter A national defense information that he had gathered that morning, including that the FBI was then engaged in an ongoing, secretive, and sensitive analysis of the bomb; analysis which involved other parts of the United States Government besides the FBI. At that time, SACHTLEBEN believed that the national defense information that he disclosed to Reporter A was classified at least at the SECRET level. 

14. Approximately two-and-a--half hours later, Reporter A and another reporter from Reporter A's news organization contacted multiple United States Government officials and stated that they knew the following facts: (1) the United States had intercepted a bomb from Yemen; (2) the FBI was analyzing the bomb; and (3) they believed, but had not confirmed, that the bomb was linked to AQAP's premier bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri. The facts that these reporters stated that they knew as of May 2, 2012 (namely, 1) and (2) in the immediately preceding sentence) constituted classified and national defense information as of that date. 

15. Beginning on May 7, 2012, multiple news organizations published articles about the disrupted suicide bomb attack and recovery of the bomb. The lead article was published by Reporter A's news organization on May 7, 2012, at approximately 4 and was entitled,  CIA Thwarts New al-Qaida Underwear Bomb Plot." Thereafier, Reporter A's news organization and other news organizations published additional articles and/or broadcast television reports about the disrupted suicide bomb attack and recovery of the bomb (referred to collectively  hereinafter as the "Media Reports").

16. Following the publication of the Media Reports, SACHTLEBEN continued to provide information to Reporter A about the bomb.  17. SACHTLEBEN was never authorized, directly or indirectly, by the United States Govemment to deliver, communicate, or transmit any classified or national defense infonnation to Reporter A or any other member of the media.  Defendant's Unauthorized Possession and Retention of National Defense Information  18. From a date uncertain to on or about July 9, 2013, SACHTLEBEN willfully possessed and retained in his residence in Carmel, Indiana, on numerous pieces of electronic media, United States Govemment documents bearing classification markings in their headers or footers or in their individually classified paragraph portion markings. The majority of these documents bore SECRET classification markings. 

19. From a date uncertain to in or about May 2012, SACHTLEBEN willfully possessed and retained in his residence in Carmel, Indiana, a containing, among other things, a Central Intelligence Agency intelligence report, bearing a classification marking and the date November 2, 2006. The CIA has conducted a formal classification review of that intelligence report and determined that the report was and remains properly marked at the classification level. The  was seized in or about May 2012, in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation of SACHTLEBEN involving his possession and distribution of child pornography. 

20. "Classified" information is defined by Executive Order 13526 ("Executive Order") as information in any form that: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or under control of the United States Government; (2) falls within one or more of the categories set forth in the Executive  Order; and (3) is classified by an original classification authority who determines that its  unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security which includes defense against transnational terrorism. Where such unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause "exceptionally grave damage" to the national security, the information is classified as Where such unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause "serious damage" to the national security, the information is classified as Where such unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause "damage" to the national security, the information is classified as  The designation means that a classified document cannot be shared with any foreign nationals or foreign govemments. 

Conclusion 

21. SACHTLEBEN engaged in the conduct described above knowingly and willfully, and not by accident, mistake, or any other innocent reason. In disclosing information to Reporter A, SACHTLEBEN did not believe that he was exposing government waste, fraud, abuse, or any  other kind of govemment malfeasance or misfeasance.  This Statement of Offense is not intended to be a complete recitation of all of the facts  known to the United States or SACHTLEBEN, but is, instead, intended to provide a sufficient  factual basis for the defendant's plea of guilty to one count of Unauthorized Disclosure of  National Defense Information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(d), and one count of Unauthorized  Possession and Retention of National Defense Information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 793(6).  Respectfully submitted,            

SEPH HOGSETT United States Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana 

SteVeFD./DeBrota'  Senior Litigation Counsel