In my last book, The New Cyberwar, I outlined some of the things Russia did to undermine the Ukrainian national election. As Bruce Schneier wrote recently for the New York Times, our voting machines are not very secure in some places. We know that, and like many of the other cyber attacks on government, we pushed those thoughts aside. Correcting those problems costs money and time. Our national leadership in cyber is as bad as I have ever seen. It is unable to correct the security of government computer networks, and doesn't want to deal with security matters that take more than a day to fix. Executive Orders do not fill the holes.
Yes, the voting machines proved hard to hack in the Ukraine, but they did not go after those. They went after the points of data aggregation in Kiev. They were not trying to stop voting. They were trying to stop the voting results from being processed. At times like this, there is no panic among government officials who is want to keep down the discussion until after the election is over and they can move on. They may find it more difficult if the results are delayed for a few weeks and they have mud on their collective faces.
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